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Once again the Court refused to recog-
nize an absolute and unqualified executive 
privilege in a president. To allow such a 
privilege would have permitted Nixon to 
withhold tapes from judicial officers 
which would roadblock the legal proceed-
ings connected with Watergate. 
The opinion distinguished legitimate 
constitutional privileges relating to mili-
tary, diplomatic, and national security 
from mere political expedience. The 
Court found that most of the presidential 
materials related more to a public interest 
in Watergate than to national security or 
diplomacy. The Court's disbelief in Nix-
on's claim for executive privilege cover-
ing all the materials was bolstered by his 
demonstrated lack of personal familarity 
with all but a few of his presidential 
materials. 
Since the bulk of the recordings and 
papers related to executive activities in 
which the public had an interest, the 
Court found that the tapes were not solely 
of a personal nature and therefore could 
not remain under Nixon's exclusive con-
trol. The Court agreed that had the former 
president's materials been of such a type, 
unrelated to Nixon's public activities, 
their removal from public scrutiny would 
be justified. 
Conceding that Nixon's privacy 
deserved some legal protection, the Court 
believed the PRMPA provided adequate 
safeguards. Under the Presidential 
Recordings Act, the materials of former 
presidents are subjected to screening pro-
cedures by government archivists. After 
screening, purely private information is to 
be returned to the chief executive and 
cannot be publicly disseminated. Even 
Nixon's brief acknowledged how limited 
the privacy interest of a public official 
would be in citing New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which 
holds that any individual entering public 
life voluntarily surrenders some rights of 
privacy. 
With a touch of irony, Nixon, who ad-
vanced his early political career by de-
nouncing the Communist Party, relied 
upon cases brought by members of the 
Party in his own Fourth Amendment argu-
ment. These cases were brought in 
response to unreasonable government 
searches of Communist Party members 
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homes for extra evidence, unrelated to the 
offenses with which they were charged. 
The Court was not persuaded by the 
argument that the net effect of the 
PRMPA amounted to an unreasonable 
search and seizure of Nixon's property. 
UnCier the Act, the scope of the archivists' 
search and investigation must be 
restricted. Nixon had stated an alternative 
of screening a president's materials via 
judicial review, but the court stated that 
this would subject him to greater public 
scrutiny. 
Nixon's claim that the PRMPA violated 
his First Amendment rights was also re-
jected. He claimed the Act restricted his 
freedom to participate freely in political 
activity, would hamper his ability to 
speak freely, and would prohibit him from 
taking inconsistent positions. The Court 
expressed confidence in the screening 
process of the PRMPA and, in his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Powell observed that 
the original District Court decision 
recommended actual involvement by Nix-
on in that process. 
Finally, Nixon urged the Act violated 
the Bill of Attainder Clause. He equated 
the legislation with the rendering of a 
guilty verdict and with subsequent 
punishment without the benefit of a trial. 
The Court admitted that Title I of the Act 
was created specifically to control Nixon's 
materials, but, the Court was quick to add 
that Title II dealt with recommendations 
for future presidential materials. Title I 
was not considered punishment in the tra-
ditional sense, since Nixon could still 
have access to his materials. After review-
ing the Congressional committee reports, 
the Court concluded that the legislative 
intent was merely to negate the Nixon-
Sampson agreement and not to punish 
Nixon. 
Undaunted by this legal setback, Nixon 
will have yet another case argued before 
the Court this term. The issue will be 
whether his presidential tapes, especially 
those involving the Watergate coverup, 




Flying In The 
Face Of Press 
Privilege 
by Andrew S. Katz 
Carnival entertainer Hugo Zacchini 
found that even a man who earns his liv-
ing by being shot from a cannon can have 
redress of his legal grievances in the na-
tion's highest court. The United States 
Supreme Court, by narrowing the scope 
of news media privilege provided by the 
First Amendment, gave the "human can-
nonball" a second chance to seek 
damages for a tortious appropriation of 
his performance in Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S.C!. 2849 
(1977). 
Zacchini's appearance as petitioner in 
the case arose from an incident occuring 
in August, 1972. He was then engaged to 
perform his "human cannonball" act on a 
regular basis at the Geagua County fair in 
Burton, Ohio. A freelance reporter for a 
local television station filmed the IS-sec-
ond act, which involved Zacchini being 
fired from a cannon into a net some 200 
feet away. Prior to the performance the 
reporter was warned by Zacchini not to 
make the film. The film clip was shown 
that evening on the 11 0' clock news, ac-
companied by favorable commentary. 
The performer subsequently brought an 
action in state court for damages against 
the station's operator, Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Company. His complaint 
alleged that the carnival act was "in-
vented by his father and . . . performed 
only by his family for the last fifty years 
. .. ," that the Broadcasting Company 
"showed and commercialized the film of 
his act without his consent ... ," and that 
this conduct was an "unlawful appropria-
tion of plaintiff's profeSSional property." 
97 S.C!. at 2851. The defendant's motion 
for summary judgment was granted by the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals of 
Ohio reversed, holding that Zacchini's 
complaint stated a cause of action for con-
version and for common law copyright in-
fringement. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion 
was looked to for the rule of law in the 
case. Recognizing Zacchini's right to the 
publicity value of his performance, the 
Ohio court nevertheless found the broad-
caster was immune from suit because" [al 
TV station has a privilege to report in its 
newscasts matters of legitimate public in-
terest which would otherwise be protected 
by an individual's right of publicity .... " 
97 S.CT. at 2852. Judgment was ren-
dered for Scripps-Howard. 
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme 
Court to consider whether the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments immunized 
Scripps-Howard from damages for its 
alleged infringement of Zacchini's state-
law "right of publicity." Supreme Court 
review was permitted because, in reaching 
its decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
had relied heavily on the First Amend-
ment principles established in Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 374 
(1964). 
To the Ohio Court these cases meant 
that the press is privileged to report mat-
ters of legitimate public interest even if 
such reports intrude on private matters, 
concluding that the press is Similarly im-
munized " ... When an individual seeks to 
publicly exploit his talents while keeping 
the benefits private." 97 S.Ct. at 2853. 
However, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the Ohio decision to the 
extent it had found immunity for Scripps-
Howard required by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. 
Justice White, writing for the majority, 
reviewed these landmark defamation 
cases and concluded they do not recog-
nize a media privilege to televise an enter-
tainer's entire act without his consent. 
These cases involved persons seeking 
damages for being 1'laced in a "false 
"LET'S GO TO 
CURLANDER'S FOR OUR 
LAW BOOKS - AND 
SOMETHING FOR THE 
SWEET TOOTH." 
• 30 day credit accepted for law students now available 
light;" nobody with a name having com-
mercial value and no claim to a right of 
publicity was involved. The State's in-
terest in permitting a right of publicity is 
in protecting the proprietary interest of 
the individual in his act, partly to en-
courage him to continue entertaining. The 
interest protected in a defamation suit is 
that of reputation. In the final analysis, 
the opinion notes, the entertainer is not 
concerned with how much publication has 
been done, as in a case of defamation, but 
rather "who gets to do the publishing." 
97 S.Ct. at 2856. 
The opinion expressed concern about 
the substantial threat to the economic 
value of Zacchini's performance posed by 
the broadcast of his entire act without 
compensation. "The effect of a public 
broadcast of the performance is similar to 
preventing petitioner from charging an 
admission fee," the opinion declared. 97 
S.Ct at 2857. 
Although the Court was unwilling to 
draw the line between media reports that 
are protected and those that amount to an 
"appropriation," it was certain that "the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer's entire act without his con-
sent." 97 S.Ct at 2857. The opinion con-
cluded that even though the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments do not require 
it, the State of Ohio could privilege the 
press as a matter of its own law. 
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ACROSS: 




18. City and Falls 
20. Bobby Orr's Milieu 
22. Not Them 
23. Computerized Law 
25. Follow 
26. Periods of Decline 
30. Loathes 
34. Eight: Prefix 
35. Although 
36. Impediment 
41. Annually: Lat. 
42. With In, Against the 
Thing 
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44. Some Law Students' Goal 
45. Reg. Nurse 
46. Greek Portico 
47. Rarity During Exams 
49. Imitation: Suffix 
50. Capable; Socially Correct 
52. Basics 
55. Louis XIV; Early Times 
56. Characteristic of: Suffix 
57. Extort 
60. Mail on the Farm: Abbr. 
61. Menacing Epithet 
64. fust Recent 
65. Term Describing Transfer 
of Property to Church 
69. Owns 
rvrum 
70. Immediately (in a Hospital) 
71. Wonder St./ Land of Opportunity 
72. Brings into Harmony 
74. Water State 
75. Professionally Immoral 
77. Source of Ruin 
79. Parsley Sprig, Lemon Wedge 
80. Pater: French 
81. Chief Support 
82. Des fuines St. 
84. Law Enforcers in San Diego 
87. First Chief Justice 
89. Executive Overseer: Abbr. 
91. Old Nuclear Watchdog 
93. Water Lily 
94. Noncontractual Civil Wrong 
95. Is Operating 
97. Land Extension 
98. Dean of 94 Across 
101. Blood Collecting Org. 
102. Word with Tears or Rock 
105. 43d Element: Abbr. 
106. Relating to a Nonparty Lawsuit 
109. Blinker 
110. Media Blurb 
Ill. Inability to Articulate Words 




118. Beer Crustacean 
120. Jr. Officers 
122. Position Preposition 
123. Devisee is One 
124. Estate, Realm 
125. Gratifies 
DOWN 
1. Liable to be Assessed 
2. Indefinite Article 
3. Row 
4. 73d Element: Abbr. 
5. Mature 
6. Criterion of Judgment 
7. Time Units: Abbr. 
8. Compass Direction 




14. Action for Breach of Parol 
or Simple Contract 
IS. Aroma Detection 
16. Regarding 
17. Printed Defamation 
19. Gold: Lat. 
21. Wt. Unit 
24. Catchword 
27. Hit 
28. That One 
29. Andrea ,...-____ = 
31. Comb. Form of Ear 
32. Bush 
33. Wil11ess Decedents 
37. Casual 
38. Speaker's Platform 
39. In the Manner That 
40. Value 
43. Elongated Fish 
48. Perjurers 
49. And so Forth 
SO. Bitter Cold 
51. Con/disjunctive 




62. Possesses Not: Contraction 
63. Groups of Islands 
66. Affected Pose 
67. From Naples: Abbr. 






77. Preliminary Degree 
78. In the Meantime: Lat. 
81. Possessory Adjective 
83. Antitank: Abbr. 
85. Allegations 
86. Rodents, Family Gliridae 
88. Attribute 
89. Depresses 
90. Wire Service 
91. City Habitat: Abbr. 
92. Silver State: Abbr. 
94. Group of Performers 
96. First Real Law School 
Hiatus 
97. Strike Money 
99. Unstressed Vowel 
100. Must Not: Contraction 
102. Type of App. Review 
103. Climate 
104. Site of First Eviction 
107. Equality 
108. Toward 
112. Pin Down; Throw 
115. Bass or Molson 
119. Type of Year 
121. English Diarist's 
Initials 
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